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I. INTRODUCTION
It is well settled that an insurer may deny coverage where the insured
has committed intentional or fraudulent acts that destroy the covered
property.2 Insurance coverage is predicated upon the fundamental prin-
ciple that the loss suffered by the insured must be fortuitous.3 A loss is not
fortuitous if the insured caused it intentionally or fraudulently.4 Further-
more, public policy and common sense dictate that the insured should not
receive a financial benefit for his or her own wrong."
Nowhere is this rule more applicable than where the insured inten-
tionally sets fire to the covered property.6  Application of this rule be-
comes less clear, however, when a co-insured spouse, innocent of any
2. See ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAw § 5.3(a), at 475
(student ed. 1988).
3. See id. Fortuitous means "[h]appening by chance or accident. Occurring
unexpectedly, or without known cause. Accidental; undesigned; adventitious.
Resulting from unavoidable physical causes." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 654 (6th
ed. 1990).
4. See KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 2, § 5.3(a), at 475. Insurance companies
insert intentional act exclusions into their policies as the basis for denying cover-
age for the intentional or fraudulent acts of the insured. See Rachel R. Watkins
Schoenig, Property Insurance and the Innocent Co-Insured: Was It All Pay and No Gain
for the Innocent Co-Insured?, 43 DRAKE L. REv. 893, 894-95 (1995). Since insurance
coverage is predicated on the concept of fortuity, however, even where there is no
express policy provision denying coverage for such intentional acts, public policy
dictates that coverage may be denied for a loss caused by an intentional act of the
insured. See KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 2, § 5.3(a), at 475; see also St. Paul Ins.
Cos. v. Talladega Nursing Home, Inc., 606 F.2d 631, 633-34 (5th Cir. 1979) (hold-
ing that it is against public policy for an insurance company to insure against the
consequence of the insured's intentional wrongful acts); 18 COUCH ON INSURANCE
2d § 74:663, at 976-79 (rev. ed. 1983 & Supp. 1996) (stating that fraudulent or in-
tentional destruction of the covered property is excepted from coverage based on
public policy and morals, and relieves the insurer of liability even if there is no
express policy provision to that effect).
5. See Schoenig, supra note 4, at 894-95 (stating that coverage may be denied
for losses caused by the insured's intentional acts in order to avoid "giving an in-
sured a license to commit wanton and otherwise wrongful acts against the insured
property" (quoting Ronald A. Hobgood & F. Anthony Lamb, Recovery by an Inno-
cent Co-Insured, FOR DEF.,July 1993, at 3)).
6. See Atlas Assurance Co. of Am. v. Mistic, 822 P.2d 897, 899 (Alaska 1991)
("Public policy dictates that an insured who intentionally sets fire to property cov-
ered by the insurance contract may not recover thereon."); 18 COUCH ON
INSURANCE 2D § 74:663, at 976 (rev. ed. 1983) ("Principles of public policy deny
the right of recovery to an insured who fraudulently sets on fire the property cov-
ered by the contract of insurance."); KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 2, § 5.4(c)(4),
at 516 ("If the owner of a building intentionally burns it down, the loss is not for-
tuitous and no property insurance will be paid to such an owner.").
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wrongdoing and the victim of domestic violence, attempts to recover un-
der the policy after the other spouse intentionally has set fire to the prop-
erty.7 The innocent co-insured spouse issue was addressed for the first
time in Minnesota in Watson v. United Services Automobile Ass'n.8 In that
case, the Minnesota Court of Appeals held that an insurer must afford in-
surance coverage to the innocent co-insured spouse to satisfy the mini-
mum requirements of Minnesota's Statutory Standard Fire Insurance pol-
icy.9 The Minnesota Supreme Court has granted review of Watson.
This Comment contends that the Minnesota Supreme Court should
affirm Watson for reasons beyond the statutory policy. The court should
fashion a rule that allows coverage for the innocent co-insured spouse
when the other spouse intentionally has burned the covered property.
The situation of the innocent co-insured spouse is unique as compared to
other types of innocent co-insureds. The innocent co-insured spouse is
often the victim of an act of domestic violence, which leaves him or her
financially and emotionally devastated. Due to this unique situation, the
Minnesota Supreme Court should adopt a rule that affords coverage to
the innocent co-insured spouse based on public policy or well-established
rules of insurance contract construction.
Part II of this Comment begins by illustrating the typical innocent co-
insured spouse case. Additionally, Part II examines how the innocent co-
insured spouse issue has been resolved by courts in other jurisdictions.
Part III outlines the Minnesota law upon which the Watson decision is
based. Part III then closely examines the Watson decision. Finally, Part IV
discusses the reasons the Minnesota Supreme Court should affirm Watson
and afford coverage to the innocent co-insured spouse.
II. OVERVIEW AND HISTORY
A. The Typical Case
Although the typical innocent co-insured spouse case seems bizarre,
the fact patterns are "surprisingly similar."' ° One spouse intentionally sets
7. See Schoenig, supra note 4, at 893 ("For more than a century, courts have
attempted to define the rights of an innocent co-insured when another insured
has fraudulently caused a loss under an insurance policy.").
8. 551 N.W.2d 500 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996), review granted (Minn. Sept. 20,
1996).
9. See id. at 502-03.
10. Leane English Cerven, The Problem of the Innocent Co-Insured Spouse: Three
Theories on Recovery, 17 VAL. U. L. REv. 849, 856 (1983); see also ROBERT H. JERRY, II,
UNDERSTANDING INSURANcE LAw § 63A at 385 (2d ed. 1996) (stating that these type
of cases represent a "recurring fact pattern"). The sheer number of cases with
this fact pattern lends support to this conclusion. See Larry D. Scheafer, Annota-
tion, Right of Innocent Insured to Recover Under Fire Policy Covering Property Intention-
ally Burned by Another Iisured, 11 A.L.R.4TH 1228 (1982 & Supp. 1990) (examining
1997]
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fire to the marital residence, either damaging the home and personal
property or destroying everything. Usually the couple is having marital
difficulty.12 And, more often than not, the incendiary act is precipitated by
an event such as the innocent spouse moving out, obtaining a restraining
order, or initiating divorce proceedings. 3 In a fit of rage, the other
spouse intentionally burns the jointly-owned home. 14  The innocent
spouse attempts to recover under the homeowner insurance policy.15 The
numerous cases with a similar fact pattern); see also cases cited infra notes 11-13.
11. See, e.g., Sales v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 849 F.2d 1383, 1384 (lth
Cir. 1988) (stating that the fire set by the husband totally destroyed the marital
home); Atlas, 822 P.2d at 898 (finding that the husband burned down the marital
home, causing $100,000 of damage); Vance v. Pekin Ins. Co., 457 N.W.2d 589, 590
(Iowa 1990) (stating that the fire set by the husband caused "substantial damage"
to the marital home); Lewis v. Homeowners Ins. Co., 432 N.W.2d 334, 335 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1988) (stating that the fire set by the husband caused extensive damage
to the marital home and personal property therein); Woodhouse v. Farmers Un-
ion Mut. Ins. Co., 785 P.2d 192, 193 (Mont. 1990) (stating that the fire set by the
husband totally destroyed the marital dwelling, including personal property
therein).
12. See, e.g., Jensen v. Jefferson County Mut. Ins. Ass'n, 510 N.W.2d 870, 871
(Iowa 1994). In Jensen, the couple began experiencing marital difficulties in
August 1990. See id. On September 19, 1990, the wife asked the husband to move
out. See id. The wife went to stay temporarily with a friend until the husband fin-
ished packing his belongings. See id. After the wife left, the husband set fire to
thejointly-owned home. See id.
13. See, e.g., Ponder v. Allstate Ins. Co., 729 F. Supp. 60, 61 (E.D. Mich. 1990)
(finding that the husband burned down the home after the wife and children
moved out); Jensen, 510 N.W.2d at 871 (finding that the husband burned the
marital home after the wife requested that he move out); Morgan v. Cincinnati
Ins. Co., 307 N.W.2d 53, 53 (Mich. 1981) (finding that the husband burned the
marital home after being served with divorce papers); Winter v. Aetna Cas. & Sur.
Co., 409 N.Y.S.2d 85, 86 (Sup. Ct. 1978) (finding that the husband returned
home after a court hearing on the wife's request for a protective order, drank half
a quart of cognac, and burned the marital dwelling); Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins.
Co. v. Pittman, 348 S.E.2d 350, 350 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986) (finding that the es-
tranged husband burned down the house after the wife moved out); Short v.
Oklahoma Farmers Union Ins. Co., 619 P.2d 588, 589 (Okla. 1980) (finding that
the husband burned the marital home after being served with divorce papers);
Dolcy v. Rhode Island Reinsurance Ass'n, 589 A.2d 313, 313 (R.I. 1991) (finding
that the estranged husband, who was subject to a restraining order, burned down
the marital home); Error v. Western Home Ins. Co., 762 P.2d 1077, 1078 (Utah
1988) (finding that the estranged husband burned down the marital home after
the wife filed for divorce and obtained a temporary restraining order against the
husband); Felder v. North River Ins. Co., 435 N.W.2d 263, 264 (Wis. Ct. App.
1988) (finding that the husband set fire to the marital home after the wife com-
menced divorce proceedings).
14. SeeJERRY, supra note 10, § 63A, at 385; see also cases cited supra note 11.
15. SeeJERRY, supra note 10, § 63A, at 385; see also cases cited supra notes 11-
13. Generally, fire insurance coverage is contained within the homeowners pol-
icy. See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW & REGULATION 195 (2d ed. 1990).
Homeowners insurance originated with fire insurance. See id. Over time, addi-
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insurer denies recovery based on the policy's intentional act exclusion or
fraud provision, contending that the intentional or fraudulent acts of one
insured voids coverage for all co-insureds, including the innocent co-
insured spouse.16
B. Traditional Analysis for Determining Coverage
To determine coverage for the innocent co-insured spouse when the
other spouse intentionally bums the insured property, courts have fo-
cused on whether the co-insured spouses' interests were joint or several.
1 7
If their interests are joint, coverage for the innocent co-insured spouse is
denied. 8 Over time, courts have used many different analyses to deter-
mine whether the interests are joint or several. 9 These include: (1)
analysis of the property interests based on the marital relationship; 20 (2) a
rebuttable presumption of joint interest in the insured property;2' (3)
analysis of the insurance contract's express language; 22 (4) analysis of the
innocent co-insured's reasonable expectations; 23 (5) analysis of the state
statutory standard fire insurance policy;24 or (6) analysis of the responsibil-
ity for the incendiary act.1
5
tional coverages were added, broadening the scope of the policy beyond fire cov-
erage. See id. It is unusual today, but theoretically possible, that a homeowner
would have a fire insurance policy separate from a homeowners policy. See id.
16. SeeJERRY, supra note 10, § 63A, at 385; see also cases cited supra notes 11-
13.
17. See Atlas, 822 P.2d at 899; Vance, 457 N.W.2d at 590; Scheafer, supra note
10, at 1229.
18. See Atlas, 822 P.2d at 899; Vance, 457 N.W.2d at 590.
19. For articles examining the various analyses used by the courts in innocent
co-insured spouse cases, see Paul B. Butler, Jr. & Bob G. Freemon, Jr., The Innocent
Coinsured: He Burns It, She Claims - Windfall or Technical Injustice?, 17 FoRUM 187
(1981); Cerven, supra note 10, at 856; Dennis T. D'Antonio et al., Protecting the In-
nocent: A Key Rule of Insurance Coverage Takes a Wild Ride in the Courts, A.B.A. J., Feb.
1997, at 78; Ronald A. Hobgood & F. Anthony Lamb, Recovery by an Innocent Co-
Insured, FOR DEF., July 1993, at 3; Schoenig, supra note 4, at 896; Stephen P. Car-
ney, Comment, Spouse's Fraud as a Bar to Insurance Recovery, 21 WM. & MARY L. REV.
543 (1979); Ann Wetherholt, Note, Insurance - Innocent Coinsured's Recovery Not
Barred by Fraud of Husband, 21 WAYNE L. REv. 169 (1974); Jill R. Wilson, Note, In-
nocent Spouse's Right to Recover in Arson Cases: The Court Fiddles While North Carolina
Burns, 17 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1022 (1981); Scheafer, supra note 10; and D.E. Ev-
ins, Annotation, Fraud, False Swearing, or Other Misconduct of Insured as Barring Re-
covery on Property Insurance by Innocent Coinsured, 24 A.L.R.3D 450 (1969).
20. See infra notes 26-44 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 45-50 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 51-68 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 70-75 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 76-84 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 85-90 and accompanying text.
1997]
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1. Old Rule: Property Ownership and the Marital Relationship
Initially, courts uniformly denied coverage to the innocent co-
insured spouse based on the co-insureds' property interests. 6  Since
spouses typically owned the property in some form of joint ownership,
courts following this analysis had little trouble concluding that the
spouses' interests were joint and not severable.27 These courts reasoned
that it was impossible to separate the innocent spouse's interest since each
spouse owned an undivided one-half interest in the whole property, not
merely part of the property. 8 The fact that the policy usually was issued in
both spouses' names also was significant.29 Since the ownership interest in
the property was joint, any insurable interest in the property also was
joint.'°
These courts also justified their decision to deny coverage based on
the nature of the marital relationship."' A married couple was considered
26. See Schoenig, supra note 4, at 896.
27. See, e.g., Kosior v. Continental Ins. Co., 13 N.E.2d 423, 425 (Mass. 1938)
(tenants in common); Morgan v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 282 N.W.2d 829, 830-31
(Mich. Ct. App. 1979) (tenancy by the entirety), rev'd, 307 N.W.2d 53, 55 (Mich.
1981); Jones v. Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Corp., 250 S.W.2d 281, 283 (Tex. Ct. App.
1952) (community property); Klemens v. Badger Mut. Ins. Co., 99 N.W.2d 865,
867 (Wis. 1959) (joint tenants), overruled by Hedtcke v. Sentry Ins. Co., 326
N.W.2d 727, 740 (Wis. 1982). This conclusion was especially easy to reach when
the married couple owned the property in tenancy by the entirety with its unity of
interest in property. See Cerven, supra note 10, at 861; see also Maravich v. Aetna
Life & Cas. Co., 504 A.2d 896, 902 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) ("Where spouses have
owned property by the entireties, these courts have disallowed recovery of insur-
ance proceeds by the innocent spouse because it would be impossible to separate
the interest of the innocent spouse... and because compensating the innocent
spouse would destroy the 'fictional oneness' of tenancy by the entireties.").
28. See Cerven, supra note 10, at 859-61; see also Maravich, 504 A.2d at 903.
The Maravich court cited Matyuf v. Phoenix Insurance Co., 27 Pa. D. & C.2d 351,
361 (1933), and noted that coverage was denied to the innocent spouse because,
asjoint owners, the spouses had a "joint duty and obligation to observe good faith
toward the insurer." Id.
29. See Vance v. Pekin Ins. Co., 457 N.W.2d 589, 590-91 (Iowa 1990); see also
Klemens, 99 N.W.2d at 866 (denying coverage to the innocent co-insured spouse
and stating that "[w]hat is material is the fact that the policy was written in the
joint names" of the spouses).
30. See Maravich, 504 A.2d at 903-04 (stating that "the insured," as used in an
insurance policy, imposes a joint obligation on both named insureds); Kosior, 13
N.E.2d at 424-25. By contrast, many decisions that have analyzed the insurance
contract without regard to the form of property ownership have interpreted "the
insured" to create a several obligation for the co-insured. See infra notes 60-61 and
accompanying text.
31. See Vance, 457 N.W.2d at 591; see also Jones, 250 S.W.2d at 282 (denying
coverage to the innocent co-insured spouse because of the marital relationship);
K/emens, 99 N.W.2d at 866 (denying coverage to the innocent co-insured spouse
because the policy was issued to the husband and wife jointly); Cerven, supra note
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a "single entity under the law."02 Their property interests were "inextrica-
bly intertwined" and their contract interests inseparable. The courts
aimed to prevent insurance fraud and to prevent the wrongdoer from
benefiting from his or her own wrong. 4 Due to the close nature of the
marital relationship, courts suspected complicity between the innocent
spouse and the arsonist spouse, which generally meant no recovery for the
innocent co-insured spouse.35 The courts regarded the married couple as
a single entity and believed that it would be against public policy to allow
that entity to recover for the arson of one of its members.6
As time passed, however, courts began to find fault with this analysis,
and it is no longer followed in most, if not all, jurisdictions.3 7 Emerging
public policy concerns and the questionable reasoning of the analysis
prompted the disfavor.38 First, the courts realized that the analogy drawn
between the property interests and the insurance policy interests was
questionable, because an insurance policy does not insure the property
itself; rather, the interest issued in an insurance policy is more accurately
characterized as the personal property of the policyholder. 9 Second, the
old rule imputed the arsonist spouse's criminal behavior to the innocent
spouse.4 This was unfair and unduly harsh because the innocent spouse
10, at 857-61 (citing Matyufv. Phoenix Ins. Co., 27 Pa. D. & C.2d 351, 358 (1933),
as an early case denying coverage to the innocent co-insured spouse based on the
marital relationship).
32. Cerven, supra note 10, at 861-62.
33. Vance, 457 N.W.2d at 591 (citing Cerven, supra note 10, at 858-62).
34. See Schoenig, supra note 4, at 896-97; see also Kulubis v. Texas Farm Bu-
reau Underwriters Ins. Co., 706 S.W.2d 953, 955 (Tex. 1986) ("[Plublic policy dic-
tates that a wrongdoer should not benefit from his wrongdoing.").
35. See Cerven, supra note 10, at 849-51.
36. See, e.g., Short v. Oklahoma Farmers Union Ins. Co., 619 P.2d 588, 590
(Okla. 1980) (stating that to allow the innocent spouse to recover was tantamount
to providing funds to the entity of which the arsonist was a member, and that re-
sult would be flatly against public policy).
37. See Cerven, supra note 10, at 857 (noting that while this analysis still is
used in some jurisdictions, it rapidly is being replaced); see also Vance, 457 N.W.2d
at 591 (stating that because the property-based rule was harsh and inequitable,
courts came up with alternative analyses).
38. See Hosey v. Seibels Bruce Group, S.C. Ins. Co., 363 So. 2d 751, 754 (Ala.
1978) ("[T]his rule has long been criticized as harsh and poorly reasoned .... ");
Vance, 457 N.W.2d at 591 ("This reasoning has been criticized - we think rightfully
so - both on insurance law principals and present day circumstances .. "); see
also Cerven, supra note 10, at 862 (outlining the criticisms of the property interest
and marital relationship approach).
39. See Vance, 457 N.W.2d at 591 (quoting Cerven, supra note 10, at 862)
("The proceeds of an insurance [policy] are personal and are held in the same
way as any personal property voluntarily acquired. Although the value of the in-
surance proceeds and that of the property are similar, the proceeds of an insur-
ance policy are not a substitute for the property.").
40. See Schoenig, supra note 4, at 897 (citing Hobgood & Lamb, supra note
1997]
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had been exonerated from any wrongdoing." Third, courts rejected the
outdated and archaic legal fiction that husband and wife are a single legal• 42
entity. Fourth, the danger of insurance fraud due to complicity between
the spouses is slight because the spouses usually are estranged." Finally,
and perhaps most importantly, courts began to recognize that denying re-
covery to the guilty spouse and permitting the innocent spouse to recover
one-half of the insured loss still prevented the wrongdoer from benefiting
from his or her own wrong.44
19, at 3-4).
41. See Hosey, 363 So. 2d at 753 (holding that an insurance company may not
use arson as a defense to recovery by an innocent co-insured spouse under a fire
insurance policy, where "there has been no finding that the [innocent] insured
directly set the fire, had knowledge and authorized its setting[,] or later ratified
the wrongful act"); American Econ. Ins. Co. v. Liggett, 426 N.E.2d 136, 139-40
(Ind. Ct. App. 1981) ("Western civilization is based upon the premise of individ-
ual responsibility for wrongdoing. We do not impose vicarious liability.., just
because of the marital relationship."). Indeed, the fundamental unfairness of
imputing the criminal conduct of the arsonist spouse to the innocent co-insured
may violate the innocent spouse's right to due process or equal protection under
the Federal Constitution. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Michigan Trial Lawyers As-
sociation at 9-13, Borman v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 521 N.W.2d 266 (Mich.
1994) (arguing that imputing the wrongful conduct of the arsonist spouse to the
innocent co-insured spouse violates due process); see also Steigler v. Insurance Co.
of N. Am., 384 A.2d 398, 401 (Del. 1978) (noting that imputing the wrongful
conduct of the arsonist spouse to the innocent co-insured spouse because of the
marital relationship may violate equal protection).
42. See Cerven, supra note 10, at 862 n.88. There have been numerous
changes in the legal treatment of marriage and marital property. See id. For ex-
ample, many states enacted Married Women's Acts, which ended coverture with
respect to the holding of marital property, thereby removing the legal unity. See
id. In some states these acts abolished tenancy by the entirety. See id. Moreover,
the legal fiction of marital oneness was created to protect the spouse's rights in
marital property from creditors when the other spouse dies. See American Economy,
426 N.E.2d at 139-40. To deny insurance coverage to an innocent co-insured
spouse is a perversion of this legal fiction. See id.; see also Hosey, 363 So. 2d at 753
(holding that where the property is intentionally destroyed, the wrongful conduct
of the arsonist spouse may not be imputed to the innocent co-insured spouse by
virtue of the marital relationship); American Hardware Mut. Ins. v. Mitchell, 870
S.W.2d 783, 785 (Ky. 1994) (iterating that the legal status of wives is separate and
apart from that of their husbands).
43. See Hogs Unlimited v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 401 N.W.2d 381, 385-
86 (Minn. 1987); Cerven, supra note 10, at 870.
44. See American Economy, 426 N.E.2d at 140. Moreover, even where there is a
chance that the arsonist spouse might receive a benefit, even indirectly, a careful
factual analysis can be made by the trial court to prevent it. See id.
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2. Rebuttable Presumption Theory
One analysis suggested as a more equitable alternative to the old rule
is the rebuttable presumption rule.45 Under this rule, the innocent co-
insured spouse is allowed "to rebut the presumption of a joint obligation
by proving his or her interests in the property to be severable."46 This
analysis has been criticized on several grounds. 4' The problem is that
while the marital relationship is not material, the divisibility of the co-
insureds' property interests is material. Thus, the rebuttable presumption
rule suffers from many of the old rule's shortcomings.48 Indeed, the abil-
ity of the innocent co-insured spouse to prove divisibility of the property
interest may be difficult, if not impossible. 49 Focusing on the property in-
terests ignores the co-insureds' rights and duties under the insurance con-
tract.50
3. Interpretation of the Insurance Contract
A more common alternative used today examines the co-insureds'
obligations under the insurance policy, as opposed to the co-insureds'
property interests, to determine severability. These courts analyze the in-
surance contract's express language to determine whether the co-
insureds' obligations under the policy to refrain from fraud or arson are
joint or several.5 If the obligation not to commit fraud or arson is joint,
not separate, then neither spouse may recover. 2 Conversely, if the obliga-
tions are separate, the innocent co-insured spouse may recover under the
policy.
To determine whether the co-insureds' obligations under the policy
are joint or several, courts focus on the term modifying the word "insured"
in the policy's intentional act exclusion or fraud provisions.4 The rules of
45. See Cerven, supra note 10, at 863-65.
46. Id. (footnote omitted).
47. See Vance v. Pekin Ins. Co., 457 N.W.2d 589, 591-92 (Iowa 1990).
48. See supra notes 37-44 and accompanying text.
49. See Vance, 457 N.W.2d at 591-92 (citing Cerven, supra note 10, at 865).
50. See id. (citing Cerven, supra note 10, at 865).
51. See, e.g., Vance, 457 N.W.2d at 592; Dolcy v. Rhode Island Joint Reinsur-
ance Ass'n, 589 A.2d 313, 314 (R.I. 1991); Schoenig, supra note 4, at 899; see also
Republic Ins. Co. v. Jernigan, 753 P.2d 229, 232 (Colo. 1988) (holding that an in-
nocent co-insured spouse is entitled to coverage because the contractual obliga-
tions under the policy are several, not joint, as to each co-insured).
52. See Dolcy, 589 A.2d at 314.
53. See id.
54. See, e.g., Obson v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 632 So. 2d 1158, 1160
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contract construction peculiar to insurance contracts apply.5 5 It is a cardi-
nal principle of insurance contract construction that policy ambiguities
are construed in favor of the insured. 6 An insurance policy term is am-
biguous if it is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation.17 If
the terms of the policy are not ambiguous, however, courts must apply the
express policy language without construing it.56 Where the policy lan-
guage is ambiguous the court will construe the policy in favor of the inno-
cent co-insured, hold that the rights and obligations under the policy are
several as to each co-insured, and afford coverage to the innocent co-
insured spouse.59
The policy language can be ambiguous when the word "the" is used
to modify the word "insured." Many courts have held that the policy un-
ambiguously affords coverage to the innocent co-insured.60 The rationale
is that when "the insured" is given its plain and ordinary meaning it un-
ambiguously refers only to the named insured who has violated the terms
of the policy.6 1 Other courts have held, however, that the term "the in-
sured" is ambiguous, possibly referring to either all insureds or only to the
insured who violated the policy provision.62
Conversely, courts have held uniformly that an insurance policy in-
tentional act exclusion or fraud provision that uses the language "an in-
sured" or "any insured" unambiguously creates a joint obligation as to all
named insureds.5 When this language is present in the insurance policy,
courts will deny coverage to the innocent co-insured spouse.6 Again, the
rationale is that these words, given their plain and ordinary meaning, un-
ambiguously refer to all insureds named in the policy. 65
Under this analysis, then, the insurance company is permitted to
55. See Schoenig, supra note 4, at 899 (citing Vance, 457 N.W.2d at 592).
56. See KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 2, § 6.3(2), at 628-29. The ambiguity is
construed against the insurer because the insurer is the party responsible for the
drafting of the insurance contract and because the insurance company has supe-
rior knowledge of the contract subject matter. See id.
57. See Vance, 457 N.W.2d at 593; Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Westchester
Fire Ins. Co., 172 S.E.2d 518, 522-23 (N.C. 1970).
58. See Schoenig, supra note 4, at 899.
59. See id.
60. See, e.g., Obson, 632 So. 2d at 1160; McAllister, 640 A.2d at 1286-87.
61. See Obson, 632 So. 2d at 1159-60.
62. See, e.g., Richards v. Hanover Ins. Co., 299 S.E.2d 561, 563 (Ga. 1983)
(holding that "the insured" in the insurance policy is ambiguous as to whether the
co-insureds' interests are joint or several and must be construed strictly against
the insurer).
63. See, e.g., Obson, 632 So. 2d at 1160; McAllister, 640 A.2d at 1286-87; see also
Vance, 457 N.W.2d at 592 (denying insurance coverage to the innocent co-insured
spouse because that policy's use of "an insured" in the intentional act exclusion
and fraud provisions created joint obligations).
64. See, e.g., Obson, 632 So. 2d at 1160; McAllister, 640 A.2d at 1287-88.
65. See McAllister, 640 A.2d at 1287-88.
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deny coverage to the innocent co-insured spouse as long as the insurer
does so with clear and unambiguous policy language. This analysis has re-
ceived widespread approval by courts and consequently has been labeled
the "best reasoned rule" by some courts and commentators.6 It is consid-
ered the better reasoned rule because the contract interpretation does
not have the inequitable result of imputing the arsonist spouse's wrongful
conduct to the innocent spouse simply because of property interests or
the marital relationship.
67
Unfortunately, this approach encourages insurers to draft policies to
exclude innocent co-insured spouses from coverage, and it fails to con-
sider the public policy reasons for allowing such coverage. 68 Moreover, the
express denial of coverage to an innocent co-insured spouse in the insur-
ance policy may run contrary to his or her reasonable expectations. 69
4. Reasonable Expectations
A reasonable expectations analysis focuses not on the meaning the
insurer would give the policy's express language, but on what meaning a
reasonable person in the position of the insured would give that policy
70language. Courts using this analysis allow coverage for the innocent co-
insured spouse who has an objectively reasonable expectation of coverage
even if the policy's express language forbids it. 71 Several courts have held
that the innocent co-insured spouse has a reasonable expectation of cov-
erage.7 For example, in Steigler v. Insurance Co. of North America73 the court
stated:
[A]n insurance contract should be read to accord with the rea-
sonable expectations of the purchaser.... Applying these prin-
ciples, we hold that an ordinary person owning an undivided in-
66. See, e.g., Vance, 457 N.W.2d at 592.
67. See id.
68. See D'Antonio et al., supra note 19, at 78. The shift to a contract-based
approach "sent a strong and undoubtedly welcome signal to insurers that properly
drafted policies could eliminate coverage for innocent co-insureds." Id.
69. See infra notes 70-75 and accompanying text.
70. See Schoenig, supra note 4, at 898.
71. See, e.g., Steigler v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 384 A.2d 398, 401 (Del.
1978) (holding that an innocent co-insured spouse had coverage even though the
policy's express language barred coverage for "the insured").
72. See Schoenig, supra note 4, at 898; see also, e.g., Haynes v. Hanover Ins.
Co., 783 F.2d 136, 138 (8th Cir. 1986); Hosey v. Seibels Bruce Group, S.C. Ins.
Co., 363 So. 2d 751, 754 (Ala. 1978); Steigler, 384 A.2d at 401; American Econ. Ins.
Co. v. Liggett, 426 N.E.2d 136, 141-42 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981); Hoyt v. New Hamp-
shire Fire Ins. Co., 29 A.2d 121, 123 (N.H. 1942); Krupp v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co.,
479 N.Y.S.2d 992, 998 (App. Div. 1984); McAllister v. Millville Ins. Co., 640 A.2d
1283, 1288 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994); Hedtcke v. Sentry Ins. Co., 326 N.W.2d 727, 739
(Wis. 1982).
73. 384 A.2d 398 (Del. 1978).
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terest in property, not versed in the nice distinctions of insur-
ance law, would naturally suppose that his [or her] individual
interest in the property was covered by a policy which named
him [or her] without qualification as one of the persons in-
sured.1
4
In short, these courts reason that the innocent co-insured spouse has rea-
sonable expectations that the spouses have a several obligation to refrain
from violating a policy's intentional act exclusion and that the arsonist
spouse's conduct will not be imputed to the innocent spouse.7
5. Statutory Standard Fire Insurance Policies
Recently, several courts have looked to the state's statutory regulation
of fire insurance policies to determine whether the innocent co-insured's
76interest is joint or several. Courts that apply this approach follow a two-
step analysis. First, the court applies insurance contract interpretation
rules to determine whether the statutory policy creates joint or several ob-
ligations to refrain from arson as to each insured." It has been held that
the use of "the insured" in the statutory policy creates a several obligation
as to each co-insured.8 Conversely, if the statutory policy uses "an in-
sured" or "any insured" it has been held to create joint obligations as to
each co-insured.7 9
Second, these courts look to the innocent co-insured spouse's policy
to see whether it conforms to the statutory policy.0 Statutory standard fire
insurance policies set forth the minimum amount of coverage an insurer
must provide." A policy that does not meet the minimum requirements is
reformed by the court to meet the statute's requirements. If the statu-
tory policy creates a several obligation by using "the insured," an insurance
74. Id. at 401 (citation omitted).
75. See, e.g., id.
76. See, e.g., Ponder v. Allstate Ins. Co., 729 F. Supp. 60, 61 (E.D. Mich. 1990);
Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Dean, 441 S.E.2d 436, 437-38 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994); Ob-
son v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 632 So. 2d 1158, 1158 (La. 1994); Borman v.
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 521 N.W.2d 266, 269-70 (Mich. 1994); Morgan v. Cin-
cinnati Ins. Co., 307 N.W.2d 53, 54 (Mich. 1981).
77. See, e.g., Obson, 632 So. 2d at 1159-60.
78. See Ponder, 729 F. Supp. at 61; Obson, 632 So. 2d at 1159-60.
79. See Ponder, 729 F. Supp. at 61; Obson, 632 So. 2d at 1159-60.
80. See, e.g., Ponder, 729 F. Supp. at 61 (noting that once the obligation under
the statutory policy has been determined, the issue becomes whether the policy at
issue in the particular case must be reformed to conform with the standard fire
insurance policy).
81. See, e.g., Borman, 521 N.W.2d at 269 (stating that each fire insurance pol-
icy "shall contain, at a minimum, the coverage provided for in the standard fire
insurance policy").
82. See, e.g., Ponder, 729 F. Supp. at 61-62; Obson, 632 So. 2d at 1161.
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policy that uses "an insured" or "any insured" is reformed to meet the re-
quirements of the statute.83 Thus, in cases where the statutory policy's
fraud and intentional act provisions create obligations that are several, not
joint, the innocent co-insured spouse can recover, regardless of whether
his or her own insurance policy has language to the contrary.
8 4
6. Responsibility for the Incendiary Act
Another analysis used by some courts determines severability based
on the responsibility or liability for the incendiary act.8 5 These courts rea-
son that if the co-insured spouse is innocent of any wrongdoing, the re-
sponsibility or liability for the incendiary act itself is several, not joint.8
6
Thus, the insurer must provide coverage to the innocent co-insured
spouse even if the policy language clearly and unambiguously forbids it.8
7
This view was most clearly articulated in Howell v. Ohio Casualty Insur-
ance Co.,8 where the court stated:
We hold that the trial court correctly determined that the fraud
of the husband was no bar to recovery under the policy by the
innocent wife. However, we reach this result irrespective of
whether the interests of the wife and husband in tenancy by the
entirety, in personal property, or in the contract right under the
policy are deemed to be joint or several. The significant factor
is that the responsibility or liability for the fraud - here the ar-
son - is several and separate rather than joint, and the hus-
band's fraud cannot be attributed or imputed to the wife who is
not implicated therein. Accordingly, the fraud of the coinsured
husband does not void the policy as to the plaintiff wife....
This conclusion is supported by the policy provisions prepared
83. See, e.g., Obson, 632 So. 2d at 1160-61.
84. See, e.g., Ponder, 729 F. Supp. at 61-62; Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Dean,
441 S.E.2d 436, 438 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994); Obson, 632 So. 2d at 1160-61; Borman, 521
N.W.2d at 267; Morgan v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 307 N.W.2d 53, 54-55 (Mich. 1981).
85. See, e.g., Howell v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 327 A.2d 240, 242 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1974); Delph v. Potomac Ins. Co., 620 P.2d 1282, 1285 (N.M. 1980);
Dolcy v. Rhode Island Reinsurance Ass'n, 589 A.2d 313, 315 (R.I. 1991); Kulbis v.
Texas Farm Bureau Underwriters Ins. Co., 706 S.W.2d 953, 955 (Tex. 1986); Error
v. Western Home Ins. Co., 762 P.2d 1077, 1081 (Utah 1988).
86. See, e.g., Dolcy, 589 A.2d at 315.
87. See id. The Dolcy court noted that:
This view always allows the innocent co-insured to recover under the pol-
icy, even if the obligation [under the policy] to refrain from fraud and
arson is deemed to be joint. According to this theory, the obligation of
the insurer under the insurance policy is considered to be several as to
each insured.
Id.
88. 327 A.2d 240 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1974).
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by the defendant carrier, even though we do not deem them
necessarily controlling here.8 9
The underlying rationale is that it is unfair to allow an insurer to deny
coverage, because it is tantamount to imputing the wrongful conduct of
one spouse to the spouse who is innocent of any wrongdoing.9
C. Determining the Amount of Coverage
Once a court finds there is coverage for the innocent co-insured
spouse, the issue turns to the amount of recovery. As a general rule, the
innocent co-insured spouse recovers his or her proportional interest (one-
half of the value of the insured property) limited, of course, by the total
policy limits.91 This appears to be the rule even when the innocent spouse
92continues to reside with the arsonist spouse.
The rationale is that permitting recovery of one-half reduces the in-
nocent spouse's loss while denying any benefit to the arsonist spouse. 93 In
addition to increasing the chances that the wrongdoer would benefit, al-
lowing the innocent co-insured spouse to recover more than one-half
would confer a windfall on the innocent spouse. If allowed to recover
more than one-half, the innocent co-insured spouse would receive more
than he or she would be entitled to upon severance of the common own-
89. Id. at 242.
90. See Error, 762 P.2d at 1080-81. In Error, the court compared the rules in
other jurisdictions and the rationales underlying those rules. See id. The court
then stated:
The rationale that most appeals to our sense of reason and fairness, and
the rationale we adopt today, is that which focuses upon the responsibil-
ity for the fraudulent act. When the responsibility or liability for the
fraud is separate rather than joint, an insured's fraud cannot be attrib-
uted or imputed to an innocent coinsured.
Id.
91. See, e.g., Atlas Assurance Co. of Am. v. Mistic, 822 P.2d 897, 901 (Alaska
1991). In Atlas, the court noted that "[t]he vast majority of courts which have
reached this issue, and which have allowed recovery at all, have held that the in-
nocent coinsured may only recover one-half of the insurance proceeds, up to the
policy limits." Id. (citing Lewis v. Homeowners Ins. Co., 432 N.W.2d 334, 336
(Mich. Ct. App. 1988)). The court then held that the innocent co-insured spouse
could recover "one-half of the damages or one-half of the [insurance] contract
limits, whichever is less." Id.; cf. Delph v. Potomac Ins. Co., 620 P.2d 1282, 1284
(N.M. 1980) (limiting the recovery of the innocent co-insured spouse to one-half
of the amount of damage up to one-half of the policy limits).
92. See Atlas, 822 P.2d at 901; see also Maravich v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 504
A.2d 896, 907 (Pa. 1986) (allowing an innocent spouse to recover one-half of in-
surance proceeds even though she continued to live with the arsonist spouse after
the fire because any benefit to the arsonist spouse was indirect).
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ership, whether by divorce or other means.4 If the arsonist spouse dies in
the fire, however, his or her interest is extinguished, and the innocent co-
insured spouse may recover the full coverage amount.95 Since the arsonist
spouse is dead, there is no risk of benefit to the wrongdoer.
96
III. COVERAGE FOR THE INNOCENT CO-INSURED
SPOUSE IN MINNESOTA
A. Minnesota Law Prior to Watson
Until recently, no Minnesota appellate decisions had considered
whether an innocent co-insured spouse could recover under a fire policy.
Two Minnesota cases, however, had addressed the issue of fire coverage
for other types of innocent co-insureds.97 In both these cases, the courts
applied the interpretation of the insurance contract analysis.98 The courts
determined coverage based on the severability of the co-insureds' obliga-
tions, under the express terms of the insurance contracts, to refrain from
intentionally or fraudulently destroying the covered property.99
In Hogs Unlimited v. Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co.,1°° two innocent
co-insured partners sought recovery under an insurance policy for their
proportionate interest in partnership property.'01 The property had been
intentionally destroyed by the third partner.02 The insurance company
denied coverage on the basis of the policy's fraud provision, which voided
94. See Atlas, 822 P.2d at 900-01; Lewis, 432 N.W.2d at 336-37.
95. See Atlas, 822 P.2d at 901; see also, e.g., American Econ. Ins. Co. v. Liggett,
426 N.E.2d 136, 144-45 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (allowing a wife full recovery under a
policy when the husband perished in the fire); Felder v. North River Ins. Co., 435
N.W.2d 263, 266 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988) (allowing a wife to recover the full amount
under the policy where the husband set fire to the marital home and then com-
mitted suicide by gunshot during the fire).
96. See Atlas, 822 P.2d at 901; American Economy, 426 N.E.2d at 140; Felder, 435
N.W.2d at 266.
97. See Hogs Unlimited v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 401 N.W.2d 381
(Minn. 1987); Reitzner v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 510 N.W.2d 20 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1993).
98. See supra notes 51-69 and accompanying text for a discussion of the in-
terpretation of the insurance contract analysis.
99. See Hogs Unlimited, 401 N.W.2d at 386; Reitzner, 510 N.W.2d at 24.
100. 401 N.W.2d 381 (Minn. 1987).
101. Id. at 383.
102. Id. at 382. Hogs Unlimited was a general partnership consisting of three
partners in the business of raising hogs. Id. The partners had obtained an insur-
ance policy on partnership property through Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance
Company. Id. The three general partners were named insureds under the terms
of the policy. Id. While the policy was in effect, one of the general partners in-
tentionally placed a hose into the barn, releasing anhydrous ammonia and caus-
ing the death of 243 hogs owned by the partnership. Id. at 383.
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coverage for losses procured by the fraud of "the insured."""3 The Minne-
sota Supreme Court held that the innocent co-insured partners could re-
cover their proportionate interests in the property.'°4 The court reasoned
that the term "the insured" in an insurance policy unambiguously refers
only to the insured who intentionally or fraudulently destroys the property
and not to innocent co-insureds. °5 An insurer may deny coverage to the
innocent co-insured, but only if it does so in the insurance contract with
clear and unambiguous language such as "an insured" or "all insureds" or
'any insured."10 6
Six years later, in Reitzner v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.,' °7 the Min-
nesota Court of Appeals was given the opportunity to apply the analysis
used by the supreme court in Hogs Unlimited. In Reitzner, the innocent co-
insured, the holder of a vendor's interest on a contract for deed, sought
recovery under a homeowner policy after the vendee intentionally set fire
to the property.'0 8 The insurance company denied coverage to the inno-
cent co-insured, noting the insurance policy's express terms voided cover-
age for "any insured" when the losses are caused by the intentional or
fraudulent acts of another insured.'0 Relying on Hogs Unlimited, the court
of appeals held that an insurer may deny coverage to an innocent co-
insured with clear and unambiguous language."0 The court reasoned that
the insurance policy's reference to "any... insured" in the intentional act
exclusion clearly and unambiguously denied coverage for an innocent co-
insured. "'
103. Id. at 384-85.
104. Id. at 386.
105. Id. at 385.
106. Id. at 386 (holding that "unless forbidden by the insurance contract, the
innocent co-insured partners may recover their proportionate interest under the
insurance policy").
107. 510 N.W.2d 20 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993).
108. Id. at 20. Stephen Walker purchased real property on a contract for
deed. Id. at 22. The contract for deed required Walker to obtain insurance on
the property, which Walker obtained through State Farm. Id. The policy named
both Walker, the vendee, and Timothy L. LaPerre, the vendor, as co-insureds un-
der the policy. Id. On or about March 28, 1991, Walker intentionally set fire to
the property. Id. LaPerre then assigned his interest in the property and any in-
terest in insurance proceeds under the State Farm policy to Bryan Reitzner. Id. at
23. Reitzner attempted to recover for the fire losses under the insurance policy as
an innocent co-insured. Id.
109. Id. at 22-23.
110. The Reitzner court seized upon the language from Hogs Unlimited that
stated an innocent co-insured could recover "unless forbidden by the insurance
contract." Id. (quoting Hogs Unlimited v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 401 N.W.2d
381, 386 (Minn. 1987)).
111. Reitzner, 510 N.W.2d at 24. Under Minnesota law, any term in an insur-
ance policy that is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation is am-
biguous. See Columbia Heights Motors v. Allstate Ins. Co., 275 N.W.2d 32, 34
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B. The Watson Case
The Minnesota Court of Appeals recently addressed coverage for an
innocent spouse in Watson v. United Services Automobile Ass 'n.12 Elizabeth
Watson and her husband, Keith Watson, jointly owned the trailer home in
which they lived."' In 1991, due to marital problems, the couple sepa-
rated and Elizabeth Watson moved out of their home.14 On January 13,
1994, soon after the couple's dissolution hearing but prior to the entry of
the dissolution judgment, Keith Watson intentionally burned the couple's
home." The fire caused $26,500 in damages to the home, as well as
$13,000 in personal property losses." 6
Elizabeth Watson filed a claim of loss with United Services Auto Asso-
ciation (USAA) hoping to recover her losses under the fire insurance pol-
icy.1 7 USAA denied coverage, citing the policy's intentional act exclusion
and fraud provisions."8 The policy excluded coverage for a loss caused by
the intentional or fraudulent act of "an insured." "9
(Minn. 1979). If a term is ambiguous, it must be construed in favor of the in-
sured. See id. at 36. In the absence of an ambiguity, the terms contained in an
insurance contract are to be understood in their plain, ordinary, and popular
meaning. See Bobich v. Oja, 258 Minn. 287, 294, 104 N.W.2d 19, 24 (1960). Con-
cluding that "any insured," as used in the insurance contract in Reitzner, clearly
and expressly denied coverage for innocent co-insureds, the court denied cover-
age. See Reitzner, 510 N.W.2d at 24 (citing Amick v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.,
862 F.2d 704, 706 (8th Cir. 1988) for the proposition that a "[k]ey factor is
whether the policy provision barring recovery by innocent co-insureds is clear and
unambiguous").
112. 551 N.W.2d 500 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996), review granted (Minn. Sept. 20,
1996).
113. Id. at 500.
114. Id. The Watsons' dissolution hearing was not held until December of
1993, some two years after they had separated. Id. Although the dissolution was
granted at the time of the hearing, the dissolution judgment was not entered until
January 31, 1994. Id.
115. Id. at 500-01.
116. Id. at 501.
117. Id. Prior to the fire, the Watsons had insured their home under a fire
insurance policy through United Services Automobile Association (USAA). Id.
The policy provided coverage up to $28,500 on the home, and an equal amount
for property loss. Id.
118. Watson, 551 N.W.2d at 501.
119. Id. Specifically, the intentional act exclusion at issue in Watson precluded
recovery for "any loss arising out of any act committed: (1) by or at the direction
of an insured; and (2) with the intent to cause a loss." Id. (emphasis added). Simi-
larly, the fraud provision stated that "[t]he entire policy will be void if an insured
has .... after a loss, willfully and with intent to defraud[,] concealed or misrepre-
sented any material fact or circumstance relating to this insurance." Id. (emphasis
added). Apparently, the insurer denied recovery based on the fact that both the
policy's intentional act exclusion and fraud provision used "an insured" and, thus,
the intentional or fraudulent acts of one insured voided coverage for all co-
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The Watson court ruled that Elizabeth Watson was entitled to recover
under the insurance policy as an innocent co-insured spouse. 2 0 The court
based its decision on the statutory Standard Fire Insurance Policy.
21 Us-
ing the approach employed by courts in two other jurisdictions, the Wat-
son court applied a two-step analysis.12 First, the court applied the mod-
em insurance contract approach and concluded that the insurance
policy's use of "an insured" in the intentional act exclusion and fraud pro-
visions unambiguously excluded coverage for all named insureds under
the policy, including innocent co-insureds.1
2
1
Second, the court compared Elizabeth Watson's insurance policy to
the statutory Standard Fire Insurance Policy 12 4 to see whether her policy
conformed with the requirements of the statutory policy. 2 The court
noted that the statutory policy's fraud provision uses the term "the in-
sured," which applies only to the named insured who has violated the
terms of the policy, not to innocent co-insureds 2 6 The statutory policy
sets forth the minimum requirements an insurer may provide; an insurer
may provide more coverage, but not less.1 27 Therefore, the court held that
the statutory policy mandates coverage for an innocent co-insured and
that the Watsons' insurance policy must be reformed to afford coverage to
Elizabeth Watson as an innocent co-insured.2  The court limited Eliza-
insureds.
120. Id. at 504.
121. Id.; see also MINN. STAT. § 65A.01 (1996) (setting out the provisions of the
Minnesota Standard Fire Insurance Policy).
122. Watson, 551 N.W.2d at 502. The cases from other jurisdictions from
which the court adopted this analysis were Ponder v. Allstate Ins. Co., 729 F. Supp.
60 (E.D. Mich. 1990) and Obson v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 632 So. 2d 1158
(La. 1994). The holdings and analyses used by the Ponder and Obson courts are
discussed supra notes 76-84 and accompanying text.
123. Watson, 551 N.W.2d at 501-02. The court noted this was the approach
used in two earlier Minnesota cases, Hogs Unlimited v. Farm Bureau Mutual Insur-
ance Co., 401 N.W.2d 381 (Minn. 1987), and Reitzner v. State Farm Fire & Casualty
Co., 510 N.W.2d 20 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993). See supra notes 97-111 and accompany-
ing text (discussing the Hogs Unlimited and Reitzner cases). The Watson court rea-
soned that "the" is a definite article and does not refer to all insureds. Watson,
551 N.W.2d at 501-02 (citing Hogs Unlimited, 401 N.W.2d at 385). Conversely, "an"
is an indefinite article and, used in its plain and ordinary sense, means any or all
insureds. Id. That is, "an insured," unlike "the insured," when given its plain and
ordinary meaning, refers to all named insureds. Id. at 502 (citing Vance v. Pekin
Ins. Co., 457 N.W.2d 589, 593 (Iowa 1990); Dolcy v. Rhode Island Joint Reinsur-
ance Ass'n, 589 A.2d 313, 316 (R.I. 1991)).
124. MINN. STAT. § 65A.01 (1996).
125. Watson, 551 N.W.2d at 502.
126. Id. (citing Hogs Unlimited, 401 N.W.2d at 384-85).
127. Id. (citing Krueger v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 510 N.W.2d 204, 209
(Minn. Ct. App. 1993)).
128. Id. (citing Ponder v. Allstate Ins. Co., 729 F. Supp. 60 (E.D. Mich. 1990);
Obson v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 632 So. 2d 1158 (La. 1994)).
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beth Watson's recovery under the policy, however, to one-half of the in-
sured loss. 9
In support of its holding, the court of appeals reasoned that the legis-
lature used "the insured" in the statute, because affording coverage to in-
nocent co-insureds effects "the better public policy.""2° The court stated:
We do not think the legislature intended to visit the blame of
the errant insured on coinsureds who, having no control over
the unauthorized conduct, are themselves blameless; nor do we
think the legislature intended to make insureds their brother's
keeper under penalty of losing their own insurance protec-
tion.3
The court further noted that the trend in modem case law has been to
allow the innocent co-insured to recover, especially in innocent spouse
cases, because the husband and wife usually are estranged, making the
likelihood of collusion slim.'"2
To justify this holding, however, the Watson court had to resolve a di-
rect conflict between the Hogs Unlimited3 and Krueger v. State Farm Fire &
Casualty Co."'3 decisions.2 " In Hogs Unlimited, the court held an insurer
may deny coverage even to an innocent co-insured as long as the policy
language is clear and unambiguous. Conversely, in Krueger, the court
held the statutory policy, which provides coverage to innocent co-insureds,
sets forth the minimum amount of coverage an insurer must provide, and
the insurer may not abridge the statute by providing less coverage.17
Thus, Hogs Unlimited allowed the insurer to deny coverage to an innocent
129. Id. at 504 (citing Hogs Unlimited, 401 N.W.2d at 386).
130. Id. at 502-03 (citing Hogs Unlimited, 401 N.W.2d at 385-86). Hogs Unlimited
is not a fire insurance case; however, the fraud provision in both the Standard
Fire Insurance Policy, Minnesota Statutes section 65A.01, and the insurance policy
at issue in Hogs Unlimited used the term "the insured." See Hogs Unlimited, 401
N.W.2d at 384. Rather than interpret what the policy at issue meant by "the in-
sured," the Hogs Unlimited court looked to the statutory policy to determine what
the legislature intended when it used the term "the insured." See id.
131. Watson, 551 N.W.2d at 502 (citing Hogs Unlimited, 401 N.W.2d at 385-86).
132. Id. at 502-03. It should be noted that although the Watson court cited
Hogs Unlimited, this quote originally was articulated in Morgan v. Cincinnati Insur-
ance Co., 307 N.W.2d 53, 60 (Mich. 1981).
133. Hogs Unlimited v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 401 N.W.2d 381 (Minn.
1987).
134. 510 N.W.2d 204 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993).
135. See Watson, 551 N.W.2d at 503.
136. Hogs Unlimited, 401 N.W.2d at 386 (holding that an innocent insured may
recover "unless forbidden by the insurance contract"); see also, e.g., Reitzner v.
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 510 N.W.2d 20, 24 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (applying
Hogs Unlimited and holding that "any... insured" unambiguously excluded cover-
age for innocent co-insureds).
137. Krueger, 510 N.W.2d at 209.
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co-insured, but Krueger precluded the insurer from doing so.'"
The Watson court resolved this conflict in favor of coverage for the
innocent co-insured spouse on two grounds. First, the court reiterated
that public policy favors coverage for innocent co-insureds. 9 Second, the
innocent co-insured has a reasonable expectation of coverage under Min-
nesota law,' 40 and the statutory policy must be construed liberally in favor
of the insured.
14 '
IV. REASONS FOR AFFIRMING WATSONAND ALLOWING COVERAGE
FOR THE INNOCENT CO-INSURED SPOUSE IN MINNESOTA
In short, the Watson court created a rule that requires insurers to al-
low coverage for the innocent co-insured spouse when the other spouse
intentionally has burned the covered property.4 2 Insurers no longer are
allowed to deny fire coverage to the innocent co-insured spouse even with
clear and unambiguous language.43 Given the unique circumstances of
the innocent co-insured spouse, as compared to other innocent co-
insureds, the Minnesota Supreme Court should affirm this ruling. 44 The
138. See Watson, 551 N.W.2d at 503.
139. Id.
140. See Atwater Creamery Co. v. Western Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 366 N.W.2d 271
(Minn. 1985) (adopting the reasonable expectations doctrine). It should be
noted that this is a somewhat contorted use of the reasonable expectations doc-
trine. The reasonable expectations doctrine is a tool of insurance contract con-
struction. See Laurie Kindel Fett, The Reasonable Expectations Doctrine: An Alterna-
tive to Bending and Stretching Traditional Tools of Contract Interpretation, 18 WM.
MITCHELL L. REv. 1113, 1122 (1992). Yet, the Watson court apparently relies on
the doctrine, at least in part, to resolve a conflict between two Minnesota appel-
late court decisions.
141. Watson, 551 N.W.2d at 503.
142. See id. at 502-03.
143. See id. It must be noted that Watson adopts a rule of absolute coverage for
any co-insured with fire insurance. See id. The court's decision is not limited to
the innocent co-insured spouse, but also includes other types of innocent co-
insureds with fire insurance. See id.
144. In the alternative, the court should broaden the scope of the Watson de-
cision to afford coverage to the innocent co-insured spouse in all cases (not just
fire insurance cases) where the other spouse has intentionally destroyed jointly-
insured marital property. The scope of the decision is not broad enough to pro-
vide coverage to the innocent co-insured spouse in all cases. It is inapplicable
when the abusive spouse destroys insured marital property by a violent act other
than arson. For example, in State v. Zeien, shortly after the wife filed a dissolution
petition, the estranged husband entered the home and damaged or destroyed a
water bed, two television sets, a video recorder, a refrigerator, a clock, and a mi-
crowave. 505 N.W.2d 498, 498 (Iowa 1993). He also punched holes in the walls
and stained the carpet. See id. The husband admitted that he damaged the prop-
erty in anger over the wife's decision to file for divorce. See id.
Under these facts, the Watson absolute coverage rule would be inapplicable
to the innocent co-insured spouse, who sought coverage under a homeowner pol-
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court should affirm, however, for reasons apart from, or in addition to,
the Minnesota Standard Fire Insurance Policy.
If the court affirms solely on the basis of the Minnesota Standard Fire
Insurance Policy, the insurance industry will use its powerful insurance
lobby to influence the state legislature to amend the statute to exclude the
innocent co-insured spouse. Simply changing the statutory policy's fraud
provision language from "the insured" to "an insured" would accomplish
this result. Unfortunately, there is no innocent co-insured spouse lobby to
guarantee that the legislature considers public policy reasons for allowing
coverage. The Minnesota Supreme Court should prevent such a result by
affording coverage to the innocent co-insured spouse based on public pol-
icy.
Furthermore, if the court fails to affirm Watson, it likely will hold that
the interpretation of the insurance contract approach used in Hogs Unlim-
ited is the applicable rule of law in innocent co-insured spouse cases. Not
only would this allow insurers to deny coverage to the innocent co-insured
spouse, but it would encourage insurers to do so. Insurers would be able
to deny coverage to an innocent co-insured spouse with the language "the
insured" in the intentional act exclusion and fraud provision. A rule
based solely on the interpretation of the insurance contract is inadequate
in innocent co-insured spouse cases. Review of the insurance policy's ex-
press language fails to address public policy concerns unique to the inno-
cent co-insured spouse.1 Indeed, in Hogs Unlimited, the supreme court
indicated that it might treat innocent spouse cases differently and specifi-
cally limited its holding to business ventures.14 7 The principles underlying
an insurance coverage rule for co-insured business partners are drastically
different than they are for co-insured spouses.
The court should affirm Watson because well-established public policy
principles unique to the circumstances of the innocent co-insured spouse
militate in favor of coverage. Even if the court refuses to acknowledge the
icy in this type of situation, because the property was not intentionally damaged
by fire. Minnesota's statute on homeowners insurance, unlike the statute on fire
insurance, does not contain a fraud and intentional act provision that requires
coverage for innocent co-insureds. See MINN. STAT. § 65A.27-30 (1996). Thus, if
the policy clearly and unambiguously excluded coverage for an innocent co-
insured, the innocent co-insured spouse would be without financial recourse. See
Hogs Unlimited, 401 N.W.2d at 386 (holding an innocent insured may recover "un-
less forbidden by the insurance contract").
In Zeien, the husband was charged and convicted under a state criminal stat-
ute for the destruction of property. See Zeien, 505 N.W.2d at 498. A criminal con-
viction does nothing to compensate the innocent spouse, however. The issue of
insurance coverage for the wife in the Zeien case was not addressed by that court.
See id.
145. See D'Antonio et al., supra note 19, at 78.
146. See id.
147. See Hogs Unlimited, 401 N.W.2d at 385-86.
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public policy considerations and reverts to the interpretation of the insur-
ance contract analysis it used in Hogs Unlimited, coverage nevertheless
should be allowed under rules of insurance contract construction. Estab-




It is a fundamental principle of insurance contract law that courts will
not enforce provisions of an insurance contract that are against public
policy. 48 Domestic violence is a problem of epidemic proportions in the
United States.9 There is a strong public policy against domestic vio-
lence . In Minnesota, this public policy against domestic violence has
148. SeeJERRY, supra note 10, § 31 (e), at 177; see also Northern States Power Co.
v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 523 N.W.2d 657, 661 (Minn. 1994) ("As with all insurance
contract-related issues, courts must consider... public policy."); RLI Ins. Co. v.
Pike, 556 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996) (citing Shank v. Fidelity Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 221 Minn. 124, 128, 21 N.W.2d 235, 238 (1945)) ("It is axiomatic that the
parties to an insurance contract... cannot make a contract which is... contrary
to public policy .... ). One commentator suggests that an insurance policy pro-
vision also violates public policy when the provision would force the insured to
engage in unreasonable behavior in order to preserve coverage. See ABRAIAM, su-
pra note 15, at 95. To preserve coverage, an innocent co-insured spouse would
have to guard his or her property, confront the violent spouse, and prevent the
violent spouse from destroying the property. The innocent spouse would be in
danger of bodily harm and would most often have to engage in violence to stop
the violent spouse. Thus, an insurance contract provision which denies coverage
to an innocent co-insured spouse can be characterized as requiring unreasonable
behavior by the innocent co-insured to preserve coverage.
149. See Margaret C. Hobday, Note, A Constitutional Response to the Realities of
Intimate Violence: Minnesota's Domestic Homicide Statute, 78 MINN. L. REv. 1285, 1285
n.1 (1994). While the actual numbers may be in dispute, all reports indicate per-
vasive domestic violence in this county. See id. Moreover, the numbers are not a
true reflection of the problem, since many instances of domestic violence go un-
reported. See id. Women are much more likely to be the victim of domestic vio-
lence than are men. See id. "Battery by a spouse or lover is the single most com-
mon reason for women entering a hospital emergency room...." Linda Mills,
Empowering Battered Women Transnationally: The Case for Postmodern Interventions, 41
J. NAT'L ASS'N SOC. WoRKERs 261, 261 (1996). Approximately 85% of all domestic
abuse victims are female. See Brief of Amicus Curiae California Alliance Against
Domestic Violence and Ad Hoc Committee of Law Professors Working on Domes-
tic Violence, at 2 n.4, Borman v. State Farm Fire Ins. & Cas. Co., 521 N.W.2d 266
(Mich. 1994) (citing Gail A. Goolkasian, Confronting Domestic Violence: A Guide for
Criminal Justice Agencies, U.S. DEP'T OFJUST. REP. (1986)). It must be noted that
this is not uniformly true, and in some cases the battering spouse can be the wife.
See id.; see also DePalma v. Bates County Mut. Ins. Co., 923 S.W.2d 385, 386 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1996) (stating that the wife apparently burned down the marital home).
150. See Blackman v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 677, 678, 682-83 (T.C. 1987). In
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been codified in the "Domestic Abuse Act." 5' A rule that allows insurers
to exclude coverage for the innocent co-insured spouse is an affront to the
public policy against domestic violence.
When a spouse burns down the marital home, it is often an act of
domestic violence or part of an ongoing pattern of domestic violence,S 152
where the arson is simply the abuser's current weapon of choice. Do-
mestic violence largely is motivated by the abusive spouse's desire to con-
trol and dominate the other spouse. 15  Typically, the domestic violence
increases when the abused spouse attempts to assert control over his or
her own life. 54 When the abused spouse attempts to leave the relation-
Blackman, the court denied the husband's loss deduction claim for a home de-
stroyed by a fire, where the husband intentionally set fire to the wife's clothes dur-
ing a domestic dispute. See id. The court stated that to allow a loss deduction
would be to encourage couples to settle their dispute with fire and would be con-
trary to the public policy against domestic violence. See id.; see also Cloutterbuck v.
Cloutterbuck, 556 A.2d 1082, 1087 (D.C. 1989) (noting the "substantial public
policy interest in protecting victims of domestic violence"); Brennan v. Orban,
678 A.2d 667, 669 (N.J. 1996) (noting public policy against domestic violence).
Public policy has been defined as "[clommunity common sense and common
conscience, extended and applied throughout the state to matters of public mor-
als, health, safety, welfare, and the like." BLACK'S LAW DIcrIONARY 1231 (6th ed.
1990).
151. MINN. STAT. § 518B.01, subds. 2(a), 4, 6 (1996). The Act enables the vic-
tim of domestic violence to obtain a court order for protection through summary
proceedings. See id. "The rationale for such statutes is expressed in the Arkansas
Domestic Abuse Act which states that 'this chapter shall meet a compelling socie-
tal need and is necessary to correct the acute and pervasive problem of violence
and abuse within households in this state."' Robin L. Preble, Family Violence and
Family Property: A Proposal for Reform, 13 LAw & INEQ. J. 401, 406 n.24 (1995) (quot-
ing ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-101 (1993 & Supp. 1995)).
152. See MINN. STAT. § 518B.01, subd. 2(a) (defining domestic abuse as "(1)
physical harm, bodily injury, or assault; (2) the infliction of fear of imminent
physical harm, bodily injury, or assault; or (3) terroristic threats"); Hogs Unlim-
ited v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 401 N.W.2d 381, 385 (Minn. 1987) (noting that
generally "one spouse torches the home to spite or hurt the other"); Brief of Ami-
cus Curiae University of Michigan Women and the Law Clinic et al. at 2, Borman
v. State Farm Fire Ins. & Cas. Co., 521 N.W.2d 266 (Mich. 1994) (citing Statement
Before the Consumer Subcomm. of the Senate Commerce, Science & Tech. Comm. (1993)
(testimony of Francis A. McGarry, President, National Association of State Fire
Marshals) (stating that the connection between arson and domestic violence is
one of the ten areas in "desperate need of research")); Jim Adams, State Is Trying
to Curb Growing Arson Problem, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Feb. 21, 1997, at 1B (not-
ing that a 1996 study by the Minnesota state fire marshal of 100 arson cases found
that one of the primary motives in arson cases is domestic violence); Deann
Smith, Task Force May Bring in Funding: Group Fights Arson on Volunteer Basis, BATON
ROUGE ADvoc., Dec. 9, 1996, at IB (noting that domestic disputes account for
many arson cases).
153. See Borman, 521 N.W.2d at 270 n.17.
154. See id.; see also Mary Schouvieller, Leaping Without Looking: Chapter 142's
Impact on Ex Parte Protection Orders and the Movement Against Domestic Violence In
1997]
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ship, the abusive spouse retaliates by burning the marital home in an ef-
fort to deprive the innocent spouse of a home and, perhaps, to force the
innocent spouse to return to the abuser.
5
If the insurer denies coverage, the innocent spouse may be forced to
decide between remaining homeless or returning to the abuser. 5 6 The
innocent co-insured spouse's inability to recover under the policy is added
incentive for the abusive spouse to commit the arson in the first place.
57
Moreover, the inability to recover under the policy means the innocent
spouse has been victimized twice: once by the abusive spouse, depriving
the innocent spouse of a home, personal property, or both; and a second
time by the insurer, depriving the innocent spouse of compensation for
the losses. 5 8 Even if the abused spouse finds the courage not to return to
Minnesota, 14 LAW & INEQ. J. 593, 626 (1996) (stating that separation from the
abuser marks the height of danger for the domestic abuse victim).
155. See Speegle v. State, 286 So. 2d 914, 917 (Ala. Crim. App. 1973) (noting
that at the husband's trial for arson of the marital home, the wife testified that the
husband warned her that unless she returned home, there would be no home to
which she could return because he would burn the house); People v. Martinez,
564 N.Y.S.2d 414, 415 (App. Div. 1991) (upholding trial court finding that es-
tranged husband intentionally burned marital home after wife refused to recon-
cile); Moore v. State, 736 P.2d 996, 998 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987) (affirming the
husband's conviction for arson of the marital home, where the wife testified at
trial that the husband told the wife that he would rather see her dead than with
anyone else); Bogan v. State, 837 S.W.2d 422, 422 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) (uphold-
ing the conviction of the husband for arson after he threatened to burn down the
house if his estranged wife did not move home).
156. See Borman, 521 N.W.2d at 270 n.17. In domestic violence cases, the
abused spouse is often financially vulnerable, and arson becomes a weapon of
economic coercion against the abused spouse who cannot recover from the loss.
See Brief of Amicus Curiae California Alliance Against Domestic Violence and Ad
Hoc Committee of Law Professors Working on Domestic Violence at 13, Borman
v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 521 N.W.2d 266 (Mich. 1994). The public policy
importance and social implications are compounded when innocent children
from the marriage are involved. See id. It is a misconception that an abused
spouse is free to leave the abusive relationship. See State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364,
370 (N.J. 1984). Battered spouses often lack the financial resources to leave. See
id. at 372. Moreover, the stigma of cultural and social stereotypes may make it dif-
ficult for the abused spouse to leave the abuser. See id. Finally, fear also may de-
ter the abused spouse from leaving the abuser. See id. The inability of many
women to leave an abusive and violent relationship is known as "battered woman's
syndrome." See LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATrERED WOMAN SYNDROME 95-104
(1984).
157. SeeBorman, 521 N.W.2d at 270.
158. See Hedtcke v. Sentry Ins. Co., 326 N.W.2d 727, 740 (Wis. 1982). In Hed-
tcke, the innocent co-insured wife sought coverage under the fire insurance policy
after the husband had pleaded guilty for the arson of the marital home. Id. at
736. At the time of the fire, the wife had moved out of the home, initiated di-
vorce proceedings, and obtained a restraining order requiring the husband to va-
cate the home. Id.
[Vol. 23
24
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 2 [1997], Art. 6
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol23/iss2/6
INNOCENT CO-INSURED SPOUSE
the abuser, the costs of the abuser's domestic violence are borne largely by
the taxpayers who fund the public welfare system.159 Allowing one spouse
to use criminal and intentional acts to deprive the innocent spouse of
both home and insurance proceeds is against public policy.
It is vitally important that courts begin to consider the impact of do-
mestic violence when deciding these types of cases. Failing to acknowl-
edge these domestic violence considerations is tantamount to sending the
message that domestic violence is not a serious problem.' 6° It also rein-
forces the erroneous, yet common, view that violence in the home is
largely a "private matter" not within the province of the courts. In af-
firming Watson, the court must further the public policy against domestic
violence and send the message that the law will not tolerate this type of
domestic violence.
2. Fairness: Avoiding a Harsh Result
As the Watson court expressly stated, the "better public policy" is to
allow coverage for the innocent co-insured spouse.16 2 Conversely, a rule
159. See Brief of Amicus Curiae University of Michigan Women and Law Clinic
et al. at 16-17, Borman v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 521 N.W.2d 266 (Mich.
1994) (citing Maryanne George, One Act, A Massive Bill: Fire in Ann Arbor Demon-
strated How Victims and Society Pay, DETROIT FREE PRESs, Feb. 17, 1994, at 16A) (ar-
guing that the denial of coverage to the innocent co-insured spouse increases the
societal costs of domestic violence by increasing the number of spouses and chil-
dren who are dependent on the welfare system, state funded shelters, or other
public assistance).
160. See Schouvieller, supra note 154, at 632. The continued high levels of
domestic violence show that the message against domestic violence is not being
heard, and more attention from the courts and legislature is needed. See Preble,
supra note 151, at 406. "The law may have come a long way in de-emphasizing the
historical view of marriage and family as private sanctuaries beyond the scrutiny of
the law, but it has not yet gone far enough." Id. Since most domestic violence
victims are women, failing to acknowledge domestic violence considerations in
innocent co-insured spouse cases is tantamount to reinforcing the negative stereo-
type that women maintain an inferior status in society and, therefore, abuse of
women is acceptable. See Schouvieller, supra note 154, at 632 (stating that domes-
tic violence is a product of society's acceptance and support of male superiority
and female inferiority); see also Hobday, supra note 149, at 1285 n.2. (citing
Bernadette Dunn Sewell, Note, History of Abuse: Societal, Judicial and Legislative Re-
sponses to the Problem of Wife Beating, 23 SuFFoLK U. L. REv. 983, 983-97 (1989))
(noting that, incredibly, wife-beating was legally acceptable until the 19th cen-
tury).
161. See Hobday, supra note 149, at 1285 ("Throughout history, society has
largely ignored domestic abuse due to the traditional view that violence in the
home constitutes a 'private matter.'"); see also Preble, supra note 151, at 406 (argu-
ing that the judicial system needs to fight this traditional view and scrutinize do-
mestic abuse).
162. Watson v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 551 N.W.2d 500, 503 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1996) (citing Hogs Unlimited v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 401 N.W.2d
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that denies coverage to the innocent co-insured spouse runs contrary to
basic principles of equity and fairness. It imputes the wrongful conduct of
the arsonist spouse to the innocent co-insured spouse merely because the• 165
spouses are insured under the same policy. This is an especially harsh
and inequitable result, because the innocent co-insured spouse is left fi-
nancially and emotionally devastated, losing both a home and personal
property. '-
A rule requiring coverage for the innocent co-insured spouse still
would preclude coverage if the insurer comes forth with evidence of com-
plicity or collusion between the co-insured spouses. Placing the burden
on the insurance company to prove the complicity or collusion is an equi-
table result, given the insurer's vastly superior financial resources.1 66 Thus,
the Minnesota Supreme Court should follow the trend in other jurisdic-
tions and afford coverage to the innocent co-insured spouse.167
3. Minimal Risk of Insurance Fraud
Finally, the public policy reasons for allowing coverage for the inno-
cent co-insured spouse outweigh the competing public policy interest in
preventing insurance fraud. It is true that "arson-for-profit," like domestic
violence, represents a serious national problem accounting for a signifi-
cant amount of all arson.16 Deterrence is hindered by the fact that arson
381, 386 (Minn. 1987)), review granted (Minn. Sept. 20, 1996).
163. See Hosey v. Seibels Bruce Group, S.C. Ins. Co., 363 So. 2d 751, 754 (Ala.
1978) (noting that imputing the wrongful act of one spouse to the other has been
criticized as a "harsh" result); Steigler v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 384 A.2d 398,
401 (Del. 1977) (noting it would be unfair and contrary to public policy to allow
an insurer to impute the wrongful conduct of the arsonist spouse to the innocent
co-insured spouse); Brief of Amicus Curiae Michigan Trial Lawyers Ass'n at 9-13,
Borman v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 521 N.W.2d 266 (Mich. 1994) (arguing that
imputing the wrongful conduct of the arsonist spouse to the innocent co-insured
spouse violates basic principals of fairness and due process).
164. See Borman, 521 N.W.2d at 270 n.1; Hedtcke v. Sentry Ins. Co., 326
N.W.2d 727, 740 (Wis. 1982).
165. In the case of complicity or collusion, the co-insured spouse is not inno-
cent, and coverage can be denied on public policy grounds and because the in-
sured has violated the fraud provision of the policy. See supra notes 2-5 and ac-
companying text (summarizing the reasoning, public policy, and methodology
behind the use of intentional act exclusions and fraud provisions in insurance
policies).
166. See American Star Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 508 P.2d 244, 249 (Or. Ct.
App. 1973) ("Normally the insurance company has resources and expertise supe-
rior to that of the insured.").
167. See Watson, 551 N.W.2d at 502 (citing Hogs Unlimited, 401 N.W.2d at 385)
(noting that the trend in most jurisdictions is to allow the innocent co-insured to
recover).
168. See Cerven, supra note 10, at 849. Insurance policyholders are considered
to be one category among the six major types of arsonists. See id. Successful in-
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is one of the most difficult crimes to investigate and prove because most of
the evidence is destroyed in the fire. 69 While law enforcement programs
designed to ferret out arson have improved, the resistance of insurance
companies in court "is still a major weapon in the fight against for-profit
arson." 70 The opportunity to recover insurance proceeds is a "primary
motivating factor behind for-profit arson."' 7' Once the incendiary origin
of a fire is determined, the "existence of financial motive renders the poli-
cyholder the most likely suspect.'
72
The innocent co-insured spouse case, however, is uniquely different
from other situations involving innocent co-insureds, because in the case
of the innocent co-insured spouse, collusion or complicity is unlikely. For
instance, co-insured business partners may be more inclined than spouses
to commit insurance fraud, especially in times of failing fortunes.'7 3 This
same reasoning does not apply in innocent spouse cases where the hus-
band and wife are estranged and one spouse burns the house to spite or
hurt the innocent spouse. 7 The act by the arsonist spouse of burning the
marital home is not intended to benefit the innocent spouse, but rather to
deprive the innocent spouse of a home and financial resources. 75 Under
these circumstances, complicity or collusion between spouses not only is
unlikely, it is patently illogical.
surance fraud harms more than just the insurance company because the insurer
passes its increased operating costs along to the insurance consumer in the form
of higher premiums. See id. at 849 n.1; see also Borman, 521 N.W.2d at 270. In
Borman, the defendant-appellant State Farm Fire & Casualty and Amicus Curiae
Auto Club Group Insurance Company argued that insurance companies must be
able to deny coverage even to innocent co-insureds when insurance contracts
have clear, unambiguous policy language. The insurance companies posited fur-
ther that this result is necessary to combat insurance fraud and to deliver home-
owners insurance to the public at affordable premiums. Borman, 521 N.W.2d at
270.
169. See Cerven, supra note 10, at 849-50.
170. Id. Indeed, "[t]he fact that the insured has been acquitted in a prior
prosecution for burning the property to defraud the insurer does not prevent the
insurer from raising incendiarism as a defense on the policy because of the differ-
ence of parties in the two actions and the greater degree of proof required in the
criminal prosecution." 18 COUcM ON INSURANCE 2D § 74:663, at 979 (rev. ed.
1983).
171. Cerven, supra note 10, at 849.
172. Id. at 850. The close and intimate nature of the marital relationship adds
to the suspicion of complicity. See id. at 851.
173. See Hogs Unlimited v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 401 N.W.2d 381, 385 (Minn.
1987). Collusion or complicity is more likely in the case of co-insureds involved in
business ventures. See id. (suggesting that in failing business ventures the tempta-
tion to collect on insurance covering business assets may be more prevalent and






Lindahl: Insurance Coverage for an Innocent Co-insured Spouse
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1997
W/YLLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVEW
B. Rules of Insurance Contract Construction
1. Reasonable Expectations
Coverage for the innocent co-insured spouse also is supported by the
reasonable expectations doctrine. This doctrine recognizes that insurance
polices are typically long and complicated documents, which the ordinary
insured will have difficulty reading and understanding.17 6 Moreover, there
is great disparity in bargaining power between insurance companies and
those who seek insurance.1 7 The insurance contract is drafted by the in-
surer with the "aid of skillful and highly paid legal talent."1 78 The insured
is forced to accept "whatever contract may be offered on a 'take-it-or-leave-
it' basis if he [or she] wishes insurance protection." 79 As a result, the ob-
jective reasonable expectations of insureds "regarding the terms of insur-
ance contracts will be honored even though painstaking study of the pol-
icy provisions would have negated those expectations."
8 0
176. See KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 2, at 634; see also Atwater Creamery Co. v.
Western Nat'l Mut Ins. Co., 366 N.W.2d 271, 277 (Minn. 1985) (noting that insur-
ance companies recognize that "a lay person lacks the necessary skills to read and
understand insurance policies, which are typically long, set out in very small type
and written from a legalistic or insurance expert's perspective").
177. See KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 2, at 634; see also Atwater Creamery Co., 366
N.W.2d at 277 ("The doctrine of protecting the reasonable expectations of the
insured is closely related to the doctrine of contracts of adhesion. Where there is
unequal bargaining power between the parties so that one party controls all of the
terms and offers the contract on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, the contract will be
strictly construed against the party who drafted it."); Fett, supra note 140, at 1119
(stating that insurance contracts are almost always contracts of adhesion because
they are drafted by the insurer). Courts give legal effect to the insureds' reason-
able expectations to account for this inequality and level the playing field between
the parties. SeeFett, supra note 140, at 1122-23.
178. Fett, supra note 140, at 1119 (citing SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON
THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 900, at 19-20 (W.Jaeger ed., 3d ed. 1973)).
179. Id.
180. Atwater Creamery Co., 366 N.W.2d at 277 (quoting Robert E. Keeton, In-
surance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83 HARV. L. REV. 961, 967
(1970)); see also Fett, supra note 140, at 1122. Stated another way, the reasonable
expectations doctrine means that "courts will protect the reasonable expectations
of applicants, insureds, and intended beneficiaries regarding the coverage af-
forded by insurance contracts even though a careful examination of the policy
provisions indicates that such expectations are contrary to the expressed intention
of the insurer." KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 2, at 633. The point, then, is that
"insurers ought not to be allowed to use qualifications, limitations, restrictions,
and exceptions in an insurance policy that are contrary to the reasonable expecta-
tions of a policyholder having an ordinary degree of familiarity with the type of
coverage involved." Id. at 637. The insurance policy coverage "should be deter-
mined in accordance with what lay persons would reasonably understand as the
scope of coverage." Id. at 636. "The reasonable expectations doctrine gives the
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Nowhere does the reasonable expectations doctrine seem more ap-
plicable than in the case of an innocent co-insured spouse.18 The inno-
cent co-insured spouse typically is not a sophisticated purchaser of insur-
ance. Instead, the typical innocent co-insured spouse is an ordinary
person who relies on the insurers to provide coverage that meets the co-
insured's needs' With respect to a property insurance contract covering
the interests of more than one insured, "an ordinary person ... not versed
in the nice distinctions of insurance law, would naturally suppose that his
[or her] individual interest in the property was covered." 1' The innocent
court a standard by which to construe insurance contracts without having to rely
on arbitrary rules which do not reflect real-life situations and without having to
bend and stretch those rules to do justice in individual cases." Atwater Creamery
Co., 366 N.W.2d at 278. Thus, the reasonable expectations doctrine applies even
when there is no ambiguity in the policy, and the policy language expressly denies
coverage to an innocent co-insured spouse. See id. (noting the policy term regard-
ing burglary was clear and unambiguous, but allowing recovery based on the in-
sured's reasonable expectations).
181. In Atwater Creamery Co., the Minnesota Supreme Court set forth several
factors for determining whether application of the reasonable expectations doc-
trine is appropriate, including: (1) whether there is unequal bargaining power
between the parties; (2) whether the insured is an ordinary, unsophisticated lay
person; (3) whether the insured relied on the insurer to provide coverage which
meets the insured's needs; (4) whether the particular policy provision is generally
known to the public; (5) whether there is a major policy term hidden as an exclu-
sion; and (6) whether the policy language is ambiguous. 366 N.W.2d at 277-78.
Factors one through four all are present in innocent co-insured spouse cases. See
infra notes 182-187 and accompanying text. Indeed, the Watson court itself ex-
pressly stated the innocent co-insureds have a reasonable expectation of coverage.
See Watson v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 551 N.W.2d 500, 503 (Minn. Ct. App.
1996), review granted (Minn. Sept. 20, 1996).
It should be noted, however, that some of the Minnesota decisions that fol-
lowed Atwater Creamery Co. suggest that factor five (hidden exclusion) must exist
for the doctrine to be applicable. See Board of Regents v. Royal Ins. Co., 517
N.W.2d 888, 891 (Minn. 1994) (suggesting that the reasonable expectations doc-
trine addresses egregious situations in which coverage described in the large print
would be defeated by an exclusion deceptively hidden in the small print); Na-
tional Indem. Co. v. Ness, 457 N.W.2d 755, 757 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (suggest-
ing the reasonable expectations doctrine has "generally been limited to those
cases in which the policy, while purporting to provide a specific coverage, so lim-
ited the coverage as to amount to a hidden exclusion"). While the presence of a
hidden exclusion is undoubtedly an important factor, a closer reading of Atwater
Creamery Co. suggests that it is not determinative, but instead is only one factor
among several that the court will consider. See Atwater Creamery Co., 366 N.W.2d at
278 (stating that the reasonable expectations doctrine applies "in certain circum-
stances, such as where major exclusions are hidden in the definitions section").
182. See Steigler v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 384 A.2d 398, 401 (Del. 1978) (re-
ferring to an innocent co-insured spouse as an "ordinary person.., not versed in
the nice distinctions of insurance law" and as an "ordinary purchaser").
183. Id. (holding that when "read to accord with the reasonable expectations
of an ordinary purchaser," a policy that names the innocent co-insured spouse
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co-insured spouse reasonably would expect that the policy for which he or
she was paying substantial premiums would provide coverage for any fire
causing loss to the property, unless he or she intentionally set it.'84 This is
true even if the spouse carefully reviews the policy terms, since the spouse
typically is an ordinary person not versed in insurance law distinctions." 5
Due to the disparity in bargaining power between the parties, even if
the innocent co-insured spouse were to notice the exclusion for innocent
co-insureds, the insurer would be unwilling to negotiate the term, forcing
the innocent co-insured to take the policy as is. 1 6 Even if the insurer were
willing to negotiate, the innocent spouse would be forced to pay extra for
additional coverage or for a separate policy to ensure that there would be
coverage in the event a loss is caused intentionally by the other spouse. A
principal reason courts give legal effect to the insured's reasonable expec-
tations is to account for this inequality and level the playing field between
the parties.8 7 Thus, the Minnesota Supreme Court should affirm Watson
based on application of the reasonable expectations doctrine.
2. Unconscionability
The unconscionability doctrine also militates in favor of coverage for
the innocent co-insured spouse. A contract is unconscionable if no rea-
sonable person would make such a contract and no fair and honest person
would accept it.'88 Unconscionable contracts, or clauses in contracts, are
characterized by unequal bargaining power between the parties, which re-
sults in absence of meaningful choice for one party and contract terms
that are unreasonably favorable to the other.89 Where a contract is found
to be unconscionable, courts may "remove the unconscionable clause or
without qualification as one of the persons insured does not bar coverage for the
innocent co-insured spouse when the other spouse destroys the property by ar-
son).
184. See id. (applying the reasonable expectations doctrine and affording cov-
erage to the innocent co-insured spouse).
185. See id.; Fett, supra note 140, at 1122.
186. See Fett, sup-a note 140, at 1119 (citing SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON
THE LAw OF CONTRACTS § 900, at 19-20 (W. Jaeger ed., 3d ed. 1973) (stating that
"insurance contracts are drafted with the aid of skillful and highly paid legal tal-
ent, from which no deviation desired by an applicant [for insurance] will be per-
mitted")).
187. See id. at 1122-23.
188. See Glarner v. Time Ins. Co., 465 N.W.2d 591, 595 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991)
(citing Overholt Crop. Ins. Serv. Co. v. Bredeson, 437 N.W.2d 698, 702 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1989)) ("A contract is unconscionable if it is such as no man [or woman] in
his [or her] senses and not under delusion would make on the one hand, and as
no honest and fair man [or woman] would accept on the other.").
189. See Gorden v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 423 F. Supp. 58, 61 (D. Ga.
1976); Vierkant v. Amco Ins. Co., 543 N.W.2d 117, 120 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996);
Glarner, 465 N.W.2d at 596.
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limit its application to avoid an unfair result."9 °
An insurance contract that bars coverage for the innocent co-insured
spouse may be unconscionable. No reasonable innocent co-insured would
make a contract requiring payment of a substantial premium if that con-
tract could be voided by the acts of some other party.'9 Similarly, no fair
and honest insurer should accept a contract that unfairly imputes wrong-
ful conduct from one spouse to the other.1 92 Insurance companies provide
a vital public service and, therefore, have a responsibility to the public to
provide fair policy terms.9 Finally, the contract is plagued by unequal
bargaining power, because the innocent co-insured spouse is forced to ac-
cept whatever terms are offered on a "take-it-or-leave-it basis."94
190. Glarner, 465 N.W.2d at 596; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 208 (1981) (stating that if the contract or a contract term is unconscionable,
"the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or may enforce the remainder of
the contract without the unconscionable term").
191. See Steigler v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 384 A.2d 398, 401 (Del. 1978)
(holding that the co-insured spouse paying a substantial premium for property
insurance would reasonably expect his or her individual interest in the property
to be covered regardless of the intentional or fraudulent acts of a co-insured).
192. See Vance v. Pekin Ins. Co., 457 N.W.2d 589, 592 (Iowa 1990) (quoting
Cerven, supra note 10, at 867-68) ("Courts recognize the fundamental injustice of
barring recovery... because a reasonable person does not expect arson to be im-
puted as a result of the acts of the spouse."); see also Steigler, 384 A.2d at 401 (not-
ing that imputing the wrongful conduct of the arsonist spouse to the innocent co-
insured spouse may violate equal protection); Brief of Amicus Curiae Michigan
Trial Lawyers Association at 9-13, Borman v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 521
N.W.2d 266 (Mich. 1994) (arguing that imputing the wrongful conduct of the ar-
sonist spouse to the innocent co-insured spouse violates due process).
193. See Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 620 P.2d 141, 146 (Cal. 1979). In
noting the special duty the insurance company has to the public, the Egan court
stated:
The insurers' obligations are ... rooted in their status as purveyors of a
vital service labeled quasi-public in nature. Suppliers of services affected
with a public interest must take the public's interest seriously, where
necessary placing it before their interest in maximizing gains and limit-
ing disbursements .... [A]s a supplier of a public service rather than a
manufactured product, the obligations of insurers go beyond meeting
reasonable expectations of coverage. The obligations of good faith and
fair dealing encompass qualities of decency and humanity inherent in
the responsibilities of a fiduciary. Insurers hold themselves out as fiduci-
aries, and with the public's trust must go private responsibility consonant
with that trust.
Id. (citations omitted); see also American Standard Ins. Co. v. Le, 539 N.W.2d 810,
815 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) ("The policy of insurance between the insurer and the
insured creates a fiduciary duty in the insurer toward its insured. Therefore,
when the parties' respective interests conflict, the insurer must subordinate its in-
terest to that of its insured.").
194. See Fett, supra note 140, at 1119. Fett addressed the issue of unconscion-
ability in insurance contracts by stating:
All insurance contracts run the risk of having unconscionable terms be-
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V. CONCLUSION
The Minnesota Supreme Court should affirm Watson. The interpre-
tation of the insurance contract analysis used in Hogs Unlimited is inade-
quate in innocent co-insured spouse cases. The innocent co-insured
spouse is often the victim of domestic violence. Insurance fraud is un-
likely because the incendiary act is intended to spite or hurt the innocent
spouse. If coverage is denied, the innocent spouse is left financially and
emotionally devastated and may become a ward of the state. Given these
unique circumstances, the court should adopt a rule that mandates cover-
age for the innocent co-insured spouse. Strong public policy against do-
mestic violence, principles of equity and fairness, and established rules of
insurance contract construction all support this result. Moreover, the su-
perior financial resources of insurers require that the insurer bear the
burden of establishing complicity between the spouses. Only if the in-
surer can establish complicity between the spouses should coverage for
the innocent co-insured spouse be denied.
Brent R Lindahl
cause they are drafted solely from the insurer's perspective, and the lan-
guage chosen is not subject to negotiation. The lack of negotiation,
coupled with the vast experience of the insurer with prior claims, results
in language which strongly favors the insurer. Insurance contracts pro-
vide insurers with many opportunities for overreaching when drafting
their policies, and courts at times refuse to enforce these terms even if
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